O'Neill M, Kobayashi S. Risky business: disambiguating ambiguityrelated responses in the brain. J Neurophysiol 102: 645-647, 2009. First published June 10, 2009 doi:10.1152/jn.00406.2009. Previous functional MRI studies reported neural correlates of risk and ambiguity based on behavioral economic theories. A recent study controlled for uncertainty by adding noise to information of an impending aversive event and demonstrated brain areas that did not track the degree of uncertainty: the activation peaked when the degraded information could be restored by cognitive efforts. In this review, we discuss how the variables defined in economics and cognitive psychology frameworks can be dissociated.
Throughout our lives we make decisions ranging from the regular and mundane, such as which mode of transport to take to work, to the irregular and profound, such as deciding whether to pursue a career in academia or industry. A common problem we face in most decisions is uncertainty, which economic decision theory classifies as either "risky," in which outcomes are uncertain but their probabilities are known, or "ambiguous," in which the probabilities of uncertain outcomes are unknown. For example, when deciding on which mode of transport (car or bike) to take to work we may consider information with (implicitly) known probabilities, such as the likelihood of rain based on the weather forecast or the likelihood of busy roads based on traffic reports. Alternatively, when deciding which type of career to pursue such probabilistic information is missing because we have not yet experienced a career trajectory and have no forecast information available.
In the 1960s it was first shown that people treat risky and ambiguous decisions differently: when given the choice between making a risky or ambiguous decision, individuals tend to opt for the risky decision (Ellsberg 1961) . This suggests that people are ambiguity averse, possibly arising from an aversion to the reduced amount of information available.
Recent neuroeconomic studies focused on elucidating whether risky and ambiguous information is separately encoded in the brain. Hsu et al. (2005) and Huettel et al. (2006) used an approach similar to that of Ellsberg (1961) to model risk and ambiguity in an experimental setting, while recording brain activations using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the risk condition, participants were given the option either to play a gamble where the probabilities of two possible outcomes were explicitly presented to the participant or to play safe and take a sure-thing fixed offer. In the ambiguous condition, the participants also chose between gambles and safe offers, but only the possible outcomes of the gamble were presented and the probabilities of the outcomes were hidden. These studies identified brain regions preferentially activated by ambiguity (frontal cortex and amygdala) and risk (parietal cortex and striatum), suggesting distinct coding of risk and ambiguity in separate brain regions. However, these studies define risk and ambiguity categorically by either fully presenting (risk) or completely hiding (ambiguity) the outcome probabilities. In the natural environment, information may be partially hidden and thus partially ambiguous. Also, ambiguity is not limited to financial outcomes, but ubiquitous in the environment.
In a recent study, Bach et al. (2009) designed a partially ambiguous situation outside the financial domain. Instead of the participants receiving monetary rewards, they received a painful electric shock to the hand as an unconditioned stimulus (US). There were three uncertainty conditions: risk, ambiguity, and ignorance. In the risk condition, the probability of receiving an electric shock was predicted by conditioned stimuli (CS), which were compounds of four rectangles either in red or yellow, with a white frame surrounding the shapes. The color sequences indicated different probabilities of receiving the shock (P ϭ 0.25, 0.50, 0.75). The ambiguous condition used the same CS design except the frame around the CS was gray, signaling to the participants that noise was added to the previously learned risky CS configurations by randomly flipping the information provided by the color of each rectangle with a probability of 0.2. By this noisy transformation of the CS, the US probability was only partially predictable according to the previously learned CS-US contingencies (second-order distribution of outcome probabilities). In a third condition called "ignorance," a completely new set of CSs were used and each CS was presented infrequently to avoid full learning of the outcome contingencies; thus the subjects remained ignorant of the probabilities of the shock.
The main finding of this study is the enhanced neural responses to ambiguous compared with responses to risky and ignorance stimuli in posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG) and posterior parietal cortex (pPAR). In these clusters, the neural responses were limited and similar for the risky and ignorance cues. No observed activations were greater for risky or ignorance compared with ambiguity cues. The dissociation of risk and ambiguity by Bach et al. (2009) corroborates the previous observations of the ambiguity-preferential responses in the pIFG and pPAR (Huettel et al. 2006) , despite the different outcome modalities of financial reward (Huettel et al. 2006) and aversive electric shock (Bach et al. 2009 ).
In the study of Bach et al. (2009) , the level of ambiguity differed across three cue stimuli: 1) the risky cues, which had no ambiguity; 2) the ambiguity cues, which had an intermediate level of ambiguity; and 3) the ignorance cues, which had full ambiguity. However, the brain activity did not change in this order, leading Bach et al. (2009) to argue that the response to ambiguity cues does not reflect ambiguity per se, but reflects how knowable, and searchable, the hidden information is. This idea is captured by the inverted U-shaped curve in the left panel in Fig. 1 (black line) ; there is no need to search for hidden information in the risky condition, given that all information is available, whereas no information can possibly be known in the ignorance condition so no search for information occurs. Only the ambiguity condition offers an incentive to search for hidden information based on the second-order distribution of outcome probabilities.
It is debatable how the ambiguity contrasts in the previous fMRI studies map onto the framework of Bach et al. (2009) because ambiguity was defined differently: in the ambiguous condition designed by Hsu et al. (2005) and Huettel et al. (2006) the probabilities were completely hidden and thus unknowable. Therefore an ambiguity response in the study by Bach et al. (2009) would be expected to correspond with the dotted grey line in the left panel of Fig. 1 . Instead, Bach et al. (2009) observed activity that corresponds with the inverted U-shaped curve in the left panel in Fig. 1 , leading them to conclude the observed signal is sensitive to how knowable, or searchable, the hidden information is. This is a novel concept that requires further definition and investigation. In particular, because it is generally believed that cognitive demands activate the prefrontal-parietal network, it is important to investigate whether the search-related activation reflects specific computation of restoring missing information or more general processes such as attention and arousal.
If the brain areas identified by Bach et al. (2009) are sensitive to hidden but searchable information then this could be further tested by parametrically controlling the amount of information hidden. This would be easily achievable by using different levels of noise transformations instead of just the one, as used in the current study. Bach et al. (2009) introduced the ignorance condition by presenting a new set of CS stimuli, although the most ambiguous situation can be achieved by adding the maximal level of noise to the conditioned stimuli. Systematic change of the noise level would allow dissociation between the inverse U-shaped tractability function (Fig. 1, left, solid black line) and monotonic ambiguity function (Fig. 1,  left, dotted grey line) .
Straightforward procedures for parametric control of noise may also be found in the visual perception research. Using random-dot kinematograms, for example, different directions of apparent motion can be associated with the presence and the absence of electric shock, while the proportion of coherently moving dots varies from 0 (all information hidden) to 100% (all information presented). Also, the task can be easily modified to investigate neural correlates of decision making under uncertainty (cf., Kim and Shadlen 1999) .
What about the brain areas sensitive to the risk of receiving electric shock? In the finance theorists' convention, the degree of risk is measured as variance of returns. When the outcome probability changes systematically from 0 to 1, uncertainty is maximal when occurrence and no occurrence are equally possible (P ϭ 0.5; black inverted U-shaped curve in Fig. 1,  right) . In contrast, the magnitude of shock expectation will monotonically increase with outcome probability when the shock intensity is held constant (dotted grey line in Fig. 1,  right) . Based on four points of outcome probability (CSϩ: P ϭ 0.25, 0.5, 0.75; CSϪ: P ϭ 0; Fig. 1, right) , Bach et al. (2009) found that the amygdala shows greater activation to CSϩ compared with that to CSϪ, whereas the ventral striatum increases activity as a function of outcome probability. However, lacking a point close to P ϭ 1.0 (near-certain shock), dissociation between risk-related uncertainty and shock expectation is difficult. Thus risk-sensitive brain areas are not shown in this study. Previous studies successfully dissociated brain areas tracking the inverted U-shape and monotonic functions (Fig. 1, right) for appetitive reward (Preuschoff et al. 2006; Tobler et al. 2007) .
With a new dimension added by Bach et al. (2009) , dissociation of neural responses to ambiguity and risk becomes a more complex task. Importantly, differential brain activation between risky and ambiguous situations does not necessarily indicate that the two forms of uncertainty are distinctly processed because risk and ambiguity may simply reflect quantitatively different levels of uncertainty. Another pitfall is the confounding factor of subjective preference, or utility. In most FIG. 1. Expected patterns of variables that change in monotonic and inverted U-shaped functions in risky and ambiguous situations. Left: the level of ambiguity increases monotonically with increases in the amount of noise added to information of outcome probability (dotted grey line). There is no ambiguity in the absence of noise (left grey square) and maximum ambiguity when all the information is hidden (right grey square). Tractability of hidden information takes an inverse U-shape as a function of the noise level (solid black line). When information is not hidden or completely hidden, search for hidden information does not occur (left and right black circles). Search for the hidden information is necessary and meaningful when it is partially hidden (middle black circle). Right: outcome expectation increases with increasing outcome probability (dotted grey line). Uncertainty related to risk is shown as an inverse U-shaped function of probability that is minimal at P ϭ 0 and P ϭ 1 and maximal at P ϭ 0.5 (solid black line). Four points of probability correspond to the conditions used in the study by Bach et al. (2009). circumstances, people are more averse to ambiguity than to risk alone; thus differential neural responses between risk and ambiguity may reflect lower utility due to ambiguity aversion. Huettel et al. (2006) took advantage of the differences in individual preferences and demonstrated the brain areas related to subjective preferences to ambiguity (pIFG) and risk (pPAR). Further studies are required to understand how neural systems process different types of uncertainty in the world and guide decision making that is subject to personal risk-and ambiguity preferences. To this end, theories of behavioral microeconomics provide a powerful framework for neuroscience research. Moreover, conventional factors in cognitive psychology, such as working memory, attention, and arousal, may benefit from reappraisal in the context of neuroeconomics.
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